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U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Center

US Army
and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency
Center

A JOINT MISSION....

U.S Navy Photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Samuel C. Peterson

Links from his ammo belt and brass fly as Sgt. Juan Morales, attached to 2nd Air Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company (ANGLICO), lays down a vicious barrage of gun fire on insurgent positions to cover U.S.
Marines movements while on patrol in the city of Ramadi. The mission was part of the continuing support by ANGLICO to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team/28th Infantry Division (2/28th BCT). 2/28th BCT was
deployed with 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Al
Anbar Province to develop the Iraqi security forces, facilitate the development of official rule of law
through democratic government reforms, and continue the development of a market-based economy
centered on Iraqi reconstruction.

.

PREFACE
As we prosecute the current campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the
Philippines, the military must also prepare for an uncertain security situation beyond the present
theaters of conflict. It is a future that will be heavily influenced by global competition for declining natural resources, rapidly rising populations in underprivileged and underdeveloped areas,
unstable economic markets, and the continuing resurgence of violent religious and secular ideologies challenging democracy as a credible political theory. Additionally, U.S. Force must account for
the impact of rapid information transfer, porous national borders, globalization, increased indigent
migrating populations with elevated expectations, and a proliferation of technologies associated
with making and employing weapons of mass destruction.
To prepare for future contingencies in such a world, we must build capabilities that enable
forces to rapidly adapt to crises emerging from unanticipated events. “Rapidly adapting” in this
context means acquiring the ability to quickly change not only weapons and the way we supply
ourselves, but the way we think and train to deal with new challenges in unfamiliar circumstances.
To deal with this security environment, we must cultivate a whole-government intra-service and
interagency culture of flexibility.
It was for the purpose of enabling U.S. land forces to see more clearly, understand more
readily, and transform more quickly that the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) at Quantico,
Virginia, took action to jointly establish the Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center), located at Fort
Leavenworth in 2006.
The information in this pamphlet outlines the COIN Center’s origin, current missions and
purpose, and vision for the future. The COIN Center is still a work in progress. But it is one that is
vitally needed to facilitate the development of a culture that enables us to more effectively adapt
as a whole government when called upon to deal with future COIN or COIN-like threats.

DANIEL S. ROPER
Colonel, Field Artillery
Director, COIN Center
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Graduates from the Iraqi Border Patrol Academy hoist US Marine Corps (USMC) Corporal (CPL)
Horton, an instructor from their class, onto their shoulders in celebration after the class graduation
ceremony during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraqi Border Patrol Academy was conducted at Al
Asad, Iraq and taught by instructors working with the USMC II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF).
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COIN Center
In 2006, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center Commander, LTG David Petraeus, and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) Commander Lt. Gen. James Mattis established the
COIN Center in response to a need to better educate and train all U.S. ground forces on the principles
and practices of counterinsurgency, and to better integrate COIN efforts among the services. To this
end, the original COIN Center mandate was to “connect the dots” among the diverse operational elements to facilitate the implementation of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the U.S. Marine
Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), and to foster integration of COIN efforts among service components preparing to deploy or already conducting COIN operations. Though it continues to function
under that original mandate, the COIN Center focus has expand its focus to sister services, the interagency, and coalition partners dealing with COIN and broader COIN-like threats.

Founders of COIN

LTG David Petraeus

LTG James Mattis

-----------------------“In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propaganda, and economic pressure, is
generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges
again—as an instrument—when the fighting ends….The picture is different in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for
the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost
throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is
applicable, to enter into alliances or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary,
every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.” Counterinsurgency Warfare,
Theory and Practice, by David Galula, Praeger Security International: Westport, Connecticut (2006 – First printed in
1964) p. 66.
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COIN Center Vision
While the development of a single military peer competitor is unlikely in the near term,
we must be realistic about the challenges posed by less well-equipped hostile national, transnational entities or coalitions/alliances that challenge traditional centers of power and leverage niche
technologies. We must also remain cognizant that a well-led and well-trained force can effectively
challenge even the most advanced technology. (The future of armed conflict for the foreseeable
future will likely be waged in densely populated multi-ethnic and multi-racial areas by belligerents
who routinely employ a greater variety of elements of power than mere force as opposed to major
conventional battles and engagements fought by national armies on battlefields devoid of population.
In such conflicts, victory will be gauged differently than in wars past. Success will not by
measured by the quantity of ground seized or the number of casualties inflicted or POWs captured.
Victory will be measured by trust and support elicited from local populations and social order and
stability established with minimum internal social oppression. Progress in COIN conflicts will be
measured in enhanced host nation competency, capacity, and legitimacy. .How well a stable order
that is both satisfactory to its people and no longer poses a threat will be the final arbiter of success.
To prepare for future complex conflicts, a strategy that integrates joint, interagency and
multi-national (JIM) is needed to ensure that required capabilities are available to future commanders.

A Way Forward

Vision

Goals

Objectives

Premier military institution for
development and integration of JIM
counterinsurgency expertise and capability
Ground forces
learn, understand
and apply COIN

COIN Doctrine and
applicable tasks /
learning objectives
integrated into PME
and institutional
training.

Improved
whole-of-government
approach

Shared understanding of capabilities and
limitations of other
government agencies
and how each contribute to successful
COIN efforts

Expanded joint
multi-national
coordination

Established coordination means to pass
lessons, observations
and insights, and improve interoperability
amongst partners.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity, The Contemporary Operational Envrironment, Pg. 21 July 2007
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A COMBAT MISSION....

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Kevin Nettnin conducts a dismounted patrol to assess the progress of security measures in the Al Dora
market area of Baghdad, Iraq, 25 May 2007. Nettnin is from Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd
Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division.

“In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the population.” Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 285.

“In the first place the army has got to provide units which are trained, organized and equipped to carry out the sort of
operations given to them, and in the second it is responsible for producing properly educated commanders and staff
officers capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level on how best to conduct the campaign. In this connection it is worth pointing out that as the enemy is likely to be employing a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him, and
although an army officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons. At every level the civil
authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of the operational
plan, although once it has been decided to use a particular measure they will know how to put it into effect.” Frank
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency & Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping,, Natraj Publishers: New Delhi, 1992) p. 7
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Mission of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center
The role of the COIN Center is to improve U.S. military counterinsurgency capabilities. It is a
collaborative “Land Service” activity that reports directly to its co-chairs - the Commanding Generals of
the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The COIN Center provides assistance to Army/USMC components in implementation/ application of the body of thought contained in FM 3-24 in order to improve US ground forces’ capability to
operate in a full- spectrum- COIN environment. It is also the primary focal point for CAC matters involving COIN operations. The COIN Center is staffed with a cadre of knowledgeable Army and Marine
Corps subject matter experts who have operational experience and academic education in counterinsurgency operations. It discharges its role using six lines of effort:

• Doctrine Implementation and “Best Practice
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
• Integration of COIN
• Research
• Advise Leaders and Organizations
• Improve Education
• Outreach

Developing robust COIN capability within
the military requires a proactive vice reactive
approach – and investment now for future success. To that end, the COIN Center is a
small investment with a big return.

Afghan soldier fires RPG at Taliban forces.
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COIN Center Engagement
Level of Engagement Current Programs
• U.S. Government COIN
• Interagency (IA) COIN
Initiative (ICI)

• Policy

• Strategic

• Media Outreach

Near term Initiatives
• Support to National Security
Council (NSC)
• Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS), U.S. Agency for
International Development
(USAID), U.S. Department of
Treasury

• Canada, United Kingdom,
Australia Initiatives Strategic
Communications / Outreach

• Project on National Security
Reform (PNSR)

• McCormick Foundation

• Africa Command
(AFRICOM)
• Research

• III Corps CAAT
• Joint Publication 3-24

• Operational

• Monthly COIN Integration
Meeting

• Theater COIN Assessment,
Afghanistan
• COIN / Irregular Warfare (IW)
Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC)

• Irregular Warfare Forum:
Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM), Special Operations
Command (SOCOM),
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine
Corps
• FM 3-24.2
• COIN Handbook
• COIN Leader Workshop

• Tactical

• IED-Defeat Integrated
Capabilities Development
Team (ICDT)
• Support to non-Brigade
Combat Teams

• COIN Centers for Excellence
Triad
• FM 3-24 Update & Conference
- Focused Research
• School of Command Preparation
& School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS)
• COIN Fellowship

Go to http://coin.army.mil for the most up-to-date information

The COIN Center supports agencies and initiatives that span the spectrum from policy
formation to tactical unit assistance. Involvement ranges from participation in efforts to
formulate interagency and international doctrine at the policy level down to direct involvement in the writing of doctrine for the Army/Marine Corps for use at the lowest tactical levels. The unusual span of engagement reflects the general character of COIN, the
resolution of which involves a host of issues that no single Service or even combination
of military Services is equipped and trained to deal with. Such must be handled as complex operations that require the participation by a wide spectrum of agencies both in and
outside of the U.S. government. As a consequence, COIN Center responsibilities demand
close coordination with a broad range of organizations.
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A MULTI-NATIONAL MISSION.......

Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Peter MacKay arrives at Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) for the dedication of the Glyn Berry Room. The KPRT located at Camp Nathan
Smith in the heart of Kandahar City is comprised of approximately 250 soldiers, drawn largely from Land
Forces Western Area (LFWA) and 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) based in Shilo, Manitoba and Edmonton, Alberta. Task Force Afghanistan is part of Canada’s contribution to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Canadians and their international partners are helping Afghan people to rebuild
their lives, their families, their communities and their nation. The mission is to improve the quality of life
of Afghan people by providing a secure environment in which Afghan society can recover from more
than 25 years of conflict.
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Integration
Coordination and collaboration with other institutions involved in counterinsurgency issues
(senior service colleges, theater COIN academies, schools and centers) ensures a consistency of doctrine, training, and education. It also promotes awareness of future trends and projections for the
contemporary operational environment; underscores the importance of understanding the nature of
insurgencies and the need to develop effective counterinsurgency strategies supported by appropriate
DOTMLPF capabilities.
• Monthly secure Video Teleconferences with stakeholders

o

Theater COIN “Centers for Excellence” (CFE)

o

Combat Training Centers

o

Service Irregular Warfare Centers

o

1st Army

o

CAC Organizations

• Interagency Collaboration
Historic and recent experience has shown that a whole government approach to COIN is vital
for success. COIN and COIN-like conflicts have a host of subtle dimensions that must be addressed by
other than military means, but which the military must understand, appreciate, and incorporate into
operationally planning without prejudice. Much of what needs to be done in COIN environments lies
in the realm of public diplomacy and reconstruction conducted by non-military agencies.

AW
WHOLE
HOLE O
OF
FG
GOVERNMENT
OVERNMENT M
MISSION....
ISSION....
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Some past practitioners of COIN have asserted that a COIN conflict is 80% political and
20% military. Though this estimated ratio cannot be mathematically confirmed, the comments
of a large number of veterans verify that something like that proportional distribution of emphasis does exist. Most returning Commanders and other Soldiers have asserted that most of
what they found themselves doing in their COIN experience was non-military in a conventional
sense, but also vitally necessary.
Moreover, many critics of the current war’s management have noted that the main
burden for such non-military activities has fallen on the military in areas well outside its traditional areas of expertise in such roles as public diplomacy, and carrying the main burden of
reconstruction and provision of aid. This latter observation signals that there is a great deal to
be done to rectify misdistribution of responsibility with the U.S. government for COIN, which
in large measure remains a key deficiency in our national ability to effectively prosecute COIN
conflicts. The analytical construct the COIN Center uses for continued analysis of distributed
responsibility for issues in a COIN environment is the acronym “DDD” or the “3Ds”: Diplomacy
(State); Development (USAID); and Defense (DoD).

The Challenge to the Way We Think
How we tend to view things

How the insurgent views things

COIN Principles
Political
Strategic

Theater/Operational

¾ Legitimacy is main objective

Political Strategic
Theater

¾ Political factors are primary
¾ Long term commitment

COIN Imperatives
Tactical

¾ Manage Information

Tactical

¾ Use appropriate force
¾ Empower lower levels
* FM 3-24

Compression of Strategic, Operational, & Tactical levels
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To deal competitively with adversaries we face in similar situations in the future, the
U.S. must have exercised and seasoned collaborative partnerships within the interagency
with support from the best and brightest drawn from not only government but private sector industry and academia. Successful COIN will require a myriad of cultural lenses to
understand the perceptions of all the stakeholders. The challenge is understanding how
factors relate and influence each other – an adaptive system of systems. Preparing for such
conflicts will require greatly increased sophistication in distinguishing between solving the
problems we can solve versus the problems we should solve.
However, such collaborative relationships will take time to develop. That said, in an
area of persistent conflict, preparation for dealing with determined enemies who rely on
asymmetric approaches to attacking the U.S. and its interests requires a proactive approach
now, not a knee jerk reaction amidst the confusion and frustration of some future crises.
Consequently, one of the chief objectives and purposes of the COIN Center is to work
towards establishing and institutionalizing an interagency planning framework that promotes
intellectual collaboration across a range of agencies both within as well as outside of government. To this end, it is seeking to establish relationships and identify opportunities for
collaboration with experts from the military, U.S. government, academic, and private sector
to ensure the development of well thought out solutions.

HADITHA, Iraq-Samir Miflih Hamid, a local program manager in Haditha, Iraq, speaks with
members of the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team and US Agency for International Development in a newly refurbished technical school Monday. The ePRT and USAID
members have funded more than $2 million in projects since February in efforts to rebuild
Iraq. The technical school will offer machinery and mechanical classes to both men and
women once completed. , Cpl. Shawn Coolman, USMC
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Service Centers
• USA & USMC COIN CENTER
• USAF Irregular Warfare Center
• USMC Irregular Warfare Center
• U.S. SOCOM J10
• U.S. JFCOM IW Center
COIN Centers for Excellence
• Camp Taji, Iraq
• Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan
Combat Training Centers
• National Training Center (NTC)
• 29 Palms (Marine)
• Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)
• Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
• Joint Maneuver Readiness Center
(JRMC)

FORSCOM/1st Army
• FT Dix

12

Academia
• Harvard
• U.S. Military Academy (USMA)
• John Hopkins University
• Kansas State University
• University of Kansas
• University of Alabama
• Pritzker Military Library
• Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI)

• Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)

International Partners
• Patewawa, Canada
• Shiloh, Canada
• Kingston, Canada
• Land Warfare Center, United Kingdom
• NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps,
Netherlands

Media
• Wall Street Journal
• Chicago Tribune
• Kansas City Star
• Congressional Quarterly
• Asharq Alawast
Think Tanks
• RAND
• U.S. Institute for Peace
(USIP)

• McCormick Foundation
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Outreach
The Coin Center establishes and maintains professional, collaborative relationships
with joint, interagency, multinational, educational, intellectual, research, media, nongovernmental, and international organizations that have a professional interest in COIN to
foster a better understanding of insurgencies and how to counter them effectively. Maintains connections with COIN centers for excellence in Afghanistan and Iraq in support of
campaign planning. Sponsor/participate in COIN conferences.

•

Sponsor COIN symposia

•

Participation in Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)

•

Maintains public and internal working webpages
o
o

http://www.coin.army.mil
https:// www.combinedarmscenter.army.mil/SO/COIN/default.aspx

•

Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) COIN Forum

•

Sponsors professional writing for publication on COIN topics

•

Partnership with academia and think tanks

•

Media

COL Daniel Roper, Director of the USA/
C
USMC COIN Center, participating in a
U
fforum about the “War on Terror” at the
Pritzker Military Library’s Front & Center
P
with John Callaway (January 31, 2008)
w
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COL Roper joined the Roe Conn Show to discuss the positive progress made in Iraq and Afghanistan
(January 31, 2008)

Media Outreach
“This is a democracy, and a free press is the fundamental underpinning of everything that we stand for, fight for, and believe in. Now, it doesn’t make any difference
then whether you like the media or you don’t like the media, they’re here to stay. It
is healthy for the American military to be exposed through the media to the public.
After all, they pay our salaries. The American people need to know what happens in
war. Perhaps if more people understood the horror, we would be less inclined to go
to war.” USMC General Walter Boomer, “Stop Whining” Proceedings (July 1998).
“It was the ethical in war, and the process on which the command mainly depended
for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander, and the commanders of the Arab army being amateurs in the art, began their war in the atmosphere of the 20th century, and thought
of their weapons without prejudice, not distinguishing one from another socially.”
T.E. Lawrence, Fourteenth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1929.
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Doctrine
COIN Doctrine Implementation and promulgation of “Best Practice” COIN Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
The COIN Center aims to promote, within the military and the interagency, a mastery of COIN operations by providing subject matter expertise to organizations integrating COIN doctrine in training and education curricula; and facilitating promulgation of
state-of-the-art COIN material through discussions, dissemination through writing and
on-line web portal exchange, and distribution through other media.
•

Strategic-level
o Contributor to U.S. Government Senior Leader Guide to Counterinsurgency

•

Operational-level
o Pa
Part
Partner
rtne
nerr wi
with
th Com
C
Combined
ombi
bine
ned
d Ar
Arms
ms D
Doc
Doctrine
octr
trin
ine
e Directorate
Dire
Di
rect
ctor
orat
ate
e (C
(CAD
(CADD)
ADD)
D) iin
n wr
writ
writing
itin
ing
g
JJP
P 33
3-24
-24
Partner
with
o P
Part
tner wit
ith
h CA
CADD
DD in
i writing
writ
itiing NATO
NATO COIN
COI
COIN
N Doctrine
Docttrine
i

Strategic/Operational Level

ICI COIN Guide
(A Work in Progress)
Level: Strategic
Scope: U.S. Government
Published: 0ct 07

FM 3-0
Level: Operational
Scope: Army
Published: Feb 08

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
Level: Operational/Tactical
Scope: US Ground Forces
Published: Dec 06
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Irregular Warfare JOC
Level: Operational
Scope: U.S. Forces
Published: Sep 07

DRAFT NATO
PUBLICATION
AJP 3.X
Counterinsurgency
and the military
Contribution

Allied Joint COIN Operations
Level: Operational
Scope: NATO Forces
Published: Est 2011-1

JP-3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations
Level: Theater Strategic/Operational
Scope: U.S. Joint Forces
Published: Est May 09
AFDD 0-3
Level: Operational/Tactical
Scope: U.S. Air Forces
Published: Aug 07

Tactical/TTP Level

FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5
Level: Operational/ Tactical
Scope: US Ground Forces
Published: Dec 06

Training SFA Teams
Level: Tactical
Scope: Transistion Teams
Published: Jul 08

FMI 3-24.2
Level: Tactical
Scope: BN-below US Ground Forces
Published: Draft Dec 08

U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Center

Level: Tactical
Scope: COIN TTP
Published: Aug 08

US Army
and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency
Center

CALL PRT
Handbook
Level: Tactical
Scope: PRTs
Published: Sep 07

CALL First 100 Days
CMD & Staff Handbook
Level: Tactical
Scope: BDE and Below
Published: Jan 08

• Tactical-level
o
o

Proponent for COIN Leaders Handbook
Partner with U.S. Army Infantry School in writing
FMI 3-24.2 (Tactics in COIN)
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Research/ Professional Publication
As with any other profession dealing with a specific common challenge, the military needs the
best and brightest minds to research, analyze, debate, and publish their conclusions to expand the COIN
professional body of knowledge upon which doctrine is written, training developed, and operational
planning is based. Moreover, such knowledge together with the source material from which it was drawn
must be appropriately preserved, distributed, and archived to ensure knowledge of COIN “best practices”
is preserved for the future after the institutional memory has faded. It is only through archiving objective
research that we can come to reliably anticipate the requirements for effectively preparing for and adequately resourcing future contingencies.
Research
To the above end, the Director of COIN serves as a member of the Combined Arms Center Executive Editorial Board that develops the Commanding General’s priority research list. In addition, the COIN
Center participates in activities conducting research including:
•
•
•
•

SAIC DOTMLPF study
Doctrine, Organization, Training, DOTMLPF Gap Analysis
Theater visits
Collection and dissemination of unit deployment preparation lessons learned

Writing for Professional Publication
Additionally, the COIN Center sponsors and mentors researchers doing monograph and master’s
thesis work on COIN issues, COIN capability assessments, and best practices from operational theaters to
identify gaps across the DOTMLPF. These include:
• Sponsorship/Mentorship of COIN-related Monographs
o SAMS
o MMAS
o War College KSIL topics
• Partnership with and/or assistance to members of:
o Academia
o Think Tanks
o Media projects
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THE COLLOQUIUM
To provide an additional avenue for authors to publish their research, the COIN Center also
maintains an on-line electronic journal named the COIN COLLOQUIUM . This on-line journal is
linked to a discussion board which enables readers of the articles published to make comments
or provide additional contributions to expand the knowledge pertaining to the subject of each
topic addressed in articles.
Subscribers to the COIN Research page are offered the opportunity to suggest topics for research, provide research work to the COIN Center for consideration of publication, and publish
articles on the COIN website.
Additionally, the COIN Center directly assists a limited number of scholars with projects of
special interest.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/colloquium/default.aspx
19

Advise
Acts as a COIN consultant to training centers, and to leader development and
training programs.
• Quarterly assistance visits to Combat Training Centers (CTC)
o National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
o Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana
o Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),
Fort Irwin, California
• Leader Workshops – 2 and 5 day courses
• Provide land force representative to Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)
• Provide support to school-houses and training/curriculum developers

COL David Maxwell, former Commander of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSTOF) provides a detailed lessons-learned briefing to students during the U.S. Army/U.S.
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Leader Workshop, 12 Aug 2008. Maxwell is currently the G-3
of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC. The workshop was held at the
Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) from 11-14 August with more than 90 students attending.
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AW
WARRIOR’S
ARRIOR’S MISSION....
MISSION....

U.S. Army Spc. Chris Avila (right) and other soldiers engage Taliban forces during a halt to repair a
disabled vehicle near the village of Allah Say, Afghanistan, on Aug. 20, 2007. Avila is assigned to
Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Brigade.
DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel, U.S. Army. (Released)

-------------------------“In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but
with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization….In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in modern warfare we are not up against just
a few armed bands spread across the territory, but rather against an armed clandestine organization
whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory will be obtained only through the
complete destruction of that organization. This is the master concept that must guide us in our study of
modern warfare.” Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency, (Praeger Security International: Connecticut, 2006) 7.

“If the enemy comes out to fight he will be met with a disciplined lethal ferocity he has never before
endured. If he plays the sly game of intimidating, beheading and torturing the innocent people of Iraq
when he thinks we’re not looking, he will be met with a cunning, a sophistication and a relentlessness
that will lead to his utter defeat. This is my promise to you as your commander and from all of us to our
honored dead.” LTC Rod Coffey, Commander, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, The “Wolfpack” Diyala Province, Iraq, 22 Jan 2008

21

FUTURE FOCUS
Operational
Theme

Scope of Work?

Stability
COIN

Complex Operations
Irregular Warfare
Interagency
Whole of Government

Organizational
Focus
Joint

Military

Service
Contractor

Land Force

Civilian

International
Interagency

Manning
Considerations
Enduring Requirements

Clearly, the global security environment is changing. Much of this change
points to a future shaped by mounting stress and volatility from failing or radicalized states in the developing world fueled by great misery and popular dissatisfaction due to the competition for resources produced by explosive birthrates and
shrinking resources. Solutions to the problems that grow out of such conditions
will demand greater international cooperation as well as more efficient and synchronized cooperation among U.S. agencies at large to stop the emergence of insurgencies before they take root. The COIN Center is at the heart of examining
and analyzing such a future, and helping the Nation and its allies to prepare for
successful steps for dealing with it.
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Improve Education
Adjusting to the COIN challenge has not been easy for either the U.S. military or the U.S. government. In many ways, the modern COIN threat is a product of globalization where greater ease of
transportation, more porous national borders, fundraising, recruitment efforts, public diplomacy, and
propaganda by insurgents over the Internet have made insurgencies transnational in ways that are entirely new. Dealing effectively with COIN requires a significant change in mindset. Among the priority
objectives of the COIN Center is to assist the Army and Marine Corps to incorporate and assimilate the
body of knowledge outlined in FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency). Additionally, the COIN Center is playing
a key role in driving the next evolution of FM 3-24 as experience generates greater understanding of
insurgency in the 21st Century. The COIN Center is also a key sponsor of an entirely new addition to
the military Field Manual library – FM 3-24.2 (Tactical Counterinsurgency). Publication of this FM will
provide COIN guidance tailored to battalions and below.
Upon request, the COIN Center provides seminars and workshops to assist training centers
and unit leadership in the development of their COIN-indoctrination programs. The focus of such
programs is to help shift the mindset of leaders, trainers, staffs, and Soldiers from conventional approaches to understanding and planning for conflict to ways that will enable participants to think and
fight unconventionally in a COIN environment. the COIN center also provides educational expertise to
Command & General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and Primary Care Clinic as they
integrate COIN instruction into their curricula.
Investment in leader development and education is among the most important actions in
preparing for future conflict . COIN requires deep and detailed context- and culture-specific understanding of local and regional conditions. Success requires leaders who can effectively understand
their environment and the impact of their actions on that environment. Consequently, COIN leaders
must learn to be both critical thinkers and innovative problem solvers that focus on “how” to think
when confronting new and unfamiliar challenges rather than relying on rote memorization of “what”
to think.
Additionally, for the U.S. to realistically deal with the most likely security threats of the future,
COIN instruction must be integrated into Army and Marine leadership training at every level. Those
who lead in COIN conflicts must be trained to be “Balanced Warriors,” capable of leading in multiple environments without necessarily striving to be multi-skilled in every dimension. Producing
leaders who have been taught to be culturally attuned, as well as skillful and adaptable organizers, trainers, and leaders is the goal. Consequently, training, leader development, and education
must increasingly focus on how to think about the environment in which a leader’s unit is to operate in and determine what must be done to most effectively influence the actors who inhabit that
environment. Moreover, such COIN training must in some way be standardized in order to align
methods and approaches across institutions to ensure progressive and sequential training as units
prepare to deploy.
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John Jeans, of the Inma Agribusiness Program, and Navy Cmdr. Kevin Anderson inspect a lettuce
field in Ramadi, Iraq, as part of the effort to revive agribusiness in Anbar Province.
Photo courtesy of Inma Agribusiness Program

---------------------------------

“One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that
military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and
police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security,
are essential ingredients for long-term success.” Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates, 26 Nov 07, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University.
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AN ENDURING MISSION....

A Marine with the 3rd Mobile Assault Platoon, Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th
Marine Regiment, overlooks the open desert south of the town of Ubaydi, Iraq, Sept. 21, 2005, in
western Al Anbar Province. Marines and Iraqi Soldiers conducted a five-day counterinsurgency
operation in Ubaydi, a former insurgent stronghold about 15 miles from the Syrian border. After
spending seven months of routing out insurgents and stabilizing the Al Qa’im region, located
along the Euphrates River in northwestern Al Anbar Province near the Syrian border, the Camp
Lejeune, N.C.-based Marines say they’re leaving the region in better shape then when they arrived last year. During the past seven months, the Marines have brought stability back to the
people of western Iraq by training Iraqi Army Soldiers and ridding the region of anti-Iraqi forces,
thanks to an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, which included Operation Steel Curtain
in November 2005 - a major offensive to disrupt insurgent activity along the Syrian border
which saw hundreds of insurgents killed or captured. “We’re able to progress now with getting
consistent (electrical) power, free and clean running water for all the villages up there, as well
as starting to rebuild the hospitals and the schoolhouses that have suffered over the last three
years,” said Col. Stephen W. Davis, who commanded all Marine forces in western Al Anbar Province for the past year, during a Pentagon press briefing last month.
(Official U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Jerad W. Alexander)
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